Copyrights-Limitations on Proprietor\u27s Exclusive Right to Vend by Ebel, David M.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 62 Issue 7 
1964 
Copyrights-Limitations on Proprietor's Exclusive Right to Vend 
David M. Ebel 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Commercial Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David M. Ebel, Copyrights-Limitations on Proprietor's Exclusive Right to Vend, 62 MICH. L. REV. 1254 
(1964). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol62/iss7/11 
 
This Recent Important Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at 
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law 
Review by an authorized editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, 
please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
1254 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
COPYRIGHTS-LIMITATIONS oN PROPRIETOR's ExcLusivE RIGHT To 
VEND-Plaintiff was the sole proprietor of copyrights on several educational 
toys. It had ordered a large number of these toys to be made by defendant 
manufacturer, but refused to accept them when tendered, claiming they 
were so defective in quality that their sale would impair plaintiff's reputa-
tion. When defendant manufacturer began selling the rejected toys to the 
co-defendants in order to recover its own investment in them, the plaintiff 
obtained a temporary restraining order against all defendants prohibiting 
further sales of the toys pending a determination of a motion for perma-
nent injunction. The district court granted a preliminary injunction of 
indefinite duration on the ground that the threatened sales might violate 
plaintiff proprietor's exclusive right to vend its copyrighted works.1 The 
defendants appealed, contending that section 27 of the Copyright Code2 
permitted them to sell the goods pursuant to New York state law.3 On 
appeal, held, order affirmed with modification to the extent that no in-
junction issue covering goods which the district court, in a further proceed-
ing, should find the plaintiff was unjustified in rejecting. A proprietor 
retains an exclusive right to vend goods embodying his copyrighted concep-
tion until he has received a "fair reward." Platt b Munk Co. v. Republic 
Graphics, Inc., 315 F.2d 847 (2d Cir. 1963). 
Every copyrighted object is subject to two occasionally inconsistent sets 
1 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1958). 
2 17 u.s.c. § 27 (1958). 
s Defendants primarily relied on N.Y. PERS. PROP. I.Aw § 141, which allows an unpaid 
seller to resell the goods in order to mitigate the buyer's damages. This section is practically 
identical to UNIPORM 8ALEs Acr § 60. The Court indicated that N.Y. LIEN I.Aw H 180, 
200-05, which stipulates certain conditions requited for existence of a lien on peISOnal 
property and which qualifies the right of a creditor to sell the goods to satisfy the lien, 
were also applicable to the defendant's argument. 
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of legal rules.• The Federal Copyright Code5 has established special rules 
to govern copyrighted objects.6 However, these objects are also subject to 
state property law7 to the extent the latter is not in conflict with the 
Federal Copyright Code.8 In the principal case the defendant claimed the 
right to sell the copyrighted goods in its possession pursuant to state prop-
erty law, while the plaintiff attempted to controvert this right by claiming 
an exclusive right to sell such goods pursuant to the Copyright Code. Be-
cause the validity of state authority to sell the goods depended upon ·the 
absence of conflicting copyright law, it was necessary for the court first to 
determine with precision the extent of plaintiff's authority, derived from 
federal copyright law, to sell the goods in question. 
Section l(a) of the Copyright Code9 establishes a comprehensive rule 
that the copyright proprietor has the exclusive right to vend all objects 
which bear his copyright. However, section 27 of the Code,10 as interpreted 
by the House Committee on Patents11 and the courts,12 extinguishes this 
exclusive right to vend a particular copy when that copy has once been 
sold by the proprietor. This "first sale" limitation on the copyright 
proprietor's exclusive right to vend a particular copy has, since its promul-
gation, received an increasingly liberal interpretation, with the result that 
• Comment, Creditors and Copyrights, 12 MERCER L. REv. 239, 243 (1960). 
IS 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216 (1958 &: Supp. IV, 1963). 
6 U.S. CoNsr. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8, gives Congress power to "promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing • • . to authors • • • the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings •••• " The word "writings" has been gradually expanded so that it 
now includes the design of certain three dimensional utilitarian objects. See Mazer v. 
Stein, 347 U.S. 201 (1954); King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 Fed. 533 (2d Cir. 1924); 
LATMAN, HowELL's COPYRIGHT LAw 12-15 (rev. ed. 1962). 
7 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 5 (2d ed. 1955). 
s The supremacy of the Copyright Code over state property law is derived from U.S. 
CoNsr. art. VI: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be 
made in Pursuance thereof • • • shall be the supreme Law of the Land • • • any Thing 
in the .•• Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." 
o ".Any person entitled thereto, upon complying with the provisions of this title, shall 
have the exclusive right: to print, reprint, publish, copy, and vend the copyrighted 
work •••• " 17 U.S.C. § l(a) (1958). (Emphasis added.) 
10 "[B]ut nothing in this title shall be deemed to forbid, prevent, or restrict the 
transfer of any copy of a copyrighted work the possession of which has been lawfully 
obtained." 17 U.S.C. § 27 (1958). 
11 "Your committee feels that it would be most unwise to permit the copyright 
proprietor to exercise any control whatever over the article which is the subject of copy-
right after said proprietor has made the first sale.'' (Emphasis added.) H.R. REP. No. 2222, 
60th Cong., 2d Sess. (1909). Although this interpretation pertains to the Copyright Act 
of 1909, ch. 320, § 41, 35 Stat. 1084, that section is practically identical with 17 U.S.C. § 27 
(1958). 
12 See, e.g., Independent News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510, 517 (3d Cir. 1961); Har-
rison v. Maynard, Merrill &: Co., 61 Fed. 689, 691 (2d Cir. 1894); United States v. Wells, 
176 F. Supp. 630, 633 (S.D. Tex. 1959). See generally BALL, COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY 
PROPERTY § 200 (1944). A literal interpretation of § 27 would cause the proprietor's 
exclusive right to vend his copyrighted objects to terminate as soon as another merely 
acquires lawful physical possession of those copies. However, no court has ever given 
§ 27 this interpretation because it is not likely that Congress intended this right to be 
destroyed simply because the proprietor permits a manufacturer, shipper, or processor 
to handle his goods. Principal case at 851. 
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it is no longer necessary for the proprietor personally and voluntarily to 
execute the sale in order for his exclusive right to vend that copy to be 
extinguished. Instead, a "first sale" sufficient to invoke section 27 may be 
effected by certain others whom, for various policy reasons, the law has 
authorized to execute a binding first sale for the proprietor.18 In the prin-
cipal case the court attempted to qualify the "first sale" test by announcing 
that it would not recognize a first sale by one other than the proprietor un-
less that sale returned to the proprietor a "fair reward" for the use of his 
copyrighted expression in the copies sold.14 Although one of the purposes 
of Congress in giving this exclusive right to the copyright proprietor was 
to provide him with a feasible way to extract a fair reward for the use of 
his copyrighted expression,15 it would seem to be neither accurate nor equita-
ble to assert that section 27 will never operate to limit this right unless the 
proprietor receives a fair reward for the use of his expression in the copies 
sold.16 
In most cases it makes no difference whether the receipt of a "fair 
reward" is made an essential prerequisite to finding an "authorized first 
sale," because ordinarily when there is a sale of a copyrighted object the 
proprietor does receive a fair reward for the use therein of his expression 
or design.17 Moreover, use of the "fair reward" criterion does not affect 
the outcome in situations where an infringer makes copies of the proprietor's 
copyrighted expression and unlawfully sells them to a bona fide purchaser. 
In this situation it is apparent that the proprietor has not received any 
compensation for the use of his expression in the unauthorized copies. 
However, it is also obvious that he has not authorized the sale of the goods; 
nor has he conducted himself in a manner which would cause the law to 
authorize another to make a "first sale" for him.18 Consequently, the pro-
prietor retains the exclusive right to vend the copies even though the bona 
fide purchaser may hold good title to the physical material comprising the 
body of the goods.19 The copyright proprietor, therefore, is able to enjoin 
the bona fide purchaser from reselling the offending copies, but he is not 
13 See, e.g., Kipling v. G. P. Putnam's Sons, 120 Fed. 631 (2d Cir. 1903); Wilder v. 
Kent, 15 Fed. 217 (W.D. Pa. 1883). 
14 Principal case at 854. 
15 See BALL, op. cit. supra note 12, at 46. 
16 The court relied exclusively on United States v. Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942), 
for the promulgation of the "fair reward" test. However, this case involved a patent pro-
prietor rather than a copyright proprietor, and the proprietor, by exercising his exclusive 
right to sell a patented object, established a monopoly in violation of the Sherman Act. 
The Court frequently qualified the application of the "fair reward" test with the words, 
"so far as the Sherman Act is concerned .... " Id. at 279,280. 
17 Occasionally a court will use both ideas within a single sentence. Bobbs-Merrill Co. 
v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 351 (1908). 
18 See Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. Smythe, 27 Fed. 914, 917 (S.D. Ohio 1886). 
19 Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Goody, 248 F.2d 260 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 
952 (1958); F. W. Woolworth Co. v. Contemporary Arts, Inc., 193 F.2d 162 (1st Cir. 1951), 
aff'd, 344 U.S. 228 (1952). See generally Latman & Tager, Liability of Innocent In/ringers 
of Copyrights (Study No. 25), in U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, COPYRIGHT I.Aw REVISION STUDIES 
(1960). 
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able to maintain an action in replevin to obtain possession of them because 
the Copyright Code does not give him the exclusive right to use or possess 
goods protected by his copyright.20 
In other situations, however, the case law is difficult to reconcile with a 
"fair reward" test. When a copyright proprietor is unwilling or unable to 
pay his debts, the court is able to authorize the sheriff to attach and sell the 
copyrighted goods for him in order to satisfy his creditors.21 The court in 
the principal case reasoned that the proprietor receives a "fair reward'' for 
the use of his copyrighted design in this situation, even though he may 
receive no direct remuneration from the sale, because he is benefited by the 
reduction of his outstanding debts to the extent of the proceeds from the 
sale.22 However, this ignores the practical reality that goods sold at a sheriff's 
sale seldom bring their fair market value and that it therefore is unlikely 
that such a sale really provides the proprietor with a "fair" reward. Never-
theless, the sheriff is authorized to execute a binding first sale for the pro-
prietor.28 This interpretation of section 27 reflects the concern of the law 
that a debtor pay his debts even if such payment deprives him of a "fair 
reward" for the use of his copyrighted expression. 
There is another situation in which the "fair reward" criterion cannot 
adequately explain the case law. When a copyright proprietor entrusts his 
copyrighted goods to an agent, and the agent, acting within the general 
scope of his apparent authority but contrary to instructions, sells them to a 
bona fide purchaser, this will probably be held a "first sale" sufficient to 
terminate the proprietor's further right to vend the copies, even though 
they are sold at a price which returns little or no reward to him for the 
use therein of his copyrighted expression.24 Motivated by the policy that in 
certain situations the principal ought to be bound by the actions of his 
agent when dealing with bona fide purchasers,25 the courts have found the 
agent authorized by law to execute the necessary "first sale" for the pro-
20 See note 9 supra. 
21 See WEIL, COPYRIGHT I.Aw 534, 542 (1917); Comment, Creditors and Copyrights, 12 
MERCER L. REv. 239, 252-53 (1960); cf. Mcclaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 
138 F.2d 493 (3d Cir. 1943); Wilder v. Kent, 15 Fed. 217 (W.D. Pa. 1883); Wilson v. 
Martin-Wilson Automatic Fire Alarm Co., 151 Mass. 515, 24 N.E. 784 (1890). But cf. In re 
Progress Lektro Shave Corp., 35 F. Supp. 915 (D. Conn. 1940). This should be compared 
with Dart v. Woodhouse, 40 Mich. 399 (1879); Comment, supra at 245-51 where the copy-
rights are common-law copyrights and not statutory copyrights. In these cases the courts 
deny even judicial sales of the copyrighted material, if it is against the proprietor's wishes, 
to protect his privacy. With statutory copyrights the proprietor waives his rights to 
privacy by publicly registering his conception. 
22 Principal case as 854. 
23 Cf. Mcclaskey v. Harbison-Walker Refractories Co., 138 F.2d 493, 499 (3d Cir. 1943); 
Wilder v. Kent, 15 Fed. 217, 219 (W.D. Pa. 1883). 
24 See Kipling v. G, P. Putnam's Sons, 120 Fed. 631, 634 (2d Cir. 1903); cf. Independent 
News Co. v. Williams, 293 F.2d 510 (3d Cir. 1961). Contra, Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. 
Smythe, 27 Fed. 914 (S.D. Ohio 1886), although there is some evidence that in this case 
the court did not believe the new purchasers were actually bona fide purchasers. Id. at 921. 
25 See R.l!srATEMENT (SECOND), AGENCY§ 175 (1958). 
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prietor.26 Rather than trying to reconcile this result with the "fair reward" 
criterion, the court in the principal case chose to deny that such a sale 
would constitute an authorized first sale sufficient to extinguish the pr9-
prietor's exclusive right to vend those copies.27 However, the court's position 
probably represents neither the majority nor the better reasoned rule. 
The situation confronting the court in the principal case required fur-
ther analysis of the authority of others to execute a "first sale" for the 
proprietor sufficient to terminate his exclusive right to vend the copies sold. 
In order to collect compensation for losses suffered when the plaintiff 
allegedly breached a contract to pay for the goods, defendant manufacturer 
sought authority to execute a "first sale" for the plaintiff without going 
through the judicial procedure necessary to invoke a sheriff's sale. The 
court was willing to recognize that the defendant had such authority, but 
only if the sale would return a "fair reward" to the proprietor for the use 
of its copyrighted design in the goods sold. With reasoning similar to that 
applicable to the sheriff's sale situation,28 the court concluded that the 
manufacturer's sale would return a "fair reward" to the proprietor only if 
the proprietor had actually incurred a liability to the manufacturer against 
which the proceeds of the sale could be applied.29 Consequently, the 
manufacturer's right to sell the goods arises only if the proprietor is the 
party in default. If the proprietor makes a claim in good faith that it is 
not the party in default, as in this case, the court will issue an injunction 
restraining the sale of the goods until this issue has been determined in a 
judicial proceeding. Presumably the proprietor could also contest its liability 
after the sale and, should it then prevail, it could collect damages against 
the manufacturer for violating its copyright even though it had not sought 
an injunction in the first instance.30 
Even without reliance upon the "fair reward" theory, the policy justi-
fications for authorizing the manufacturer to make a binding first sale if 
the proprietor is in default seem as persuasive as those which prevail in 
the sheriff's sale situation discussed earlier.31 If the proprietor is liable to 
the manufacturer it seems desirable to provide an expeditious remedy.32 
Permitting the manufacturer to rely on a self-help remedy rather than ju-
dicial aid will save time and money for both parties and reduce the likeli-
hood that the copyrighted objects will decline in value before they are 
26 See Authors &: Newspapers Ass'n v. O'Gorman Co., 147 Fed. 616, 619-20 (D.R.I. 1906). 
27 Principal case at 854. The court was probably relying on Henry Bill Publishing Co. 
v. Smythe, 27 Fed. 914 (S.D. Ohio 1886). For criticism of that decision, see WEIL, op. cit. 
supra note 21, at 538-39. In addition, there is some evidence that the agent did not sell 
to a bona fide purchaser there. Henry Bill Publishing Co. v. Smythe, supra at 921. 
28 See notes 21, 23 supra. 
29 Principal case at 855. 
30 However, it is possible in this situation that the proprietor's actions would estop 
him from later suing for violation of his copyright. 
31 See notes 21-23 supra and accompanying text. 
32 This policy, at least in a non-copyright situation, is clearly evidenced in UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE§ 2-703 and UNIFOR..'\l SALES Ac:r § 60. 
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finally sold. This remedy will not unduly deprive the copyright proprietor 
of its copyright protection because an injunction can be obtained which 
will force the manufacturer to litigate the issue of the proprietor's liability 
on the contract by asserting, in good faith, a justification for its refusal to 
accept and pay for the goods. Furthermore, the proprietor can probably 
still obtain damages for the wrongful invasion of its copyright in a judi-
cial proceeding subsequent to sale if that proceeding should absolve it of 
liability on the contract. 
Regardless of the court's rationale, the principal case represents a further 
recognition of creditors' rights at the expense of the rights of the copyright 
proprietor. The step taken is a small one, but it is toward, rather than 
away from, more complete justice. The step is small because, should the 
copyright proprietor assert in good faith a defense for its refusal to accept 
and pay for the goods, an injunction could be obtained to force the manu-
facturer to a full court proceeding similar to that in the sheriff's sale situa-
tion.38 
Even if the copyright proprietor should not attempt to enjoin the sale 
of the goods, the manufacturer might still prefer to seek a judicial remedy 
rather than resort to self-help, because there would remain the danger of 
a suit subsequent to the resale in which the manufacturer might ultimately 
be proved the party in default on the contract and might be subjected to 
substantial liability for violating the proprietor's copyright. However, the 
manufacturer may be willing to assume this risk if he feels certain that he 
is not the party in default. Furthermore, if the proprietor has no other 
substantial assets and the copyrighted goods held by the manufacturer as 
security are rapidly declining in value, it seems quite likely that the manu-
facturer would prefer the risk of violating the proprietor's copyright to the 
possibility of a judgment against the proprietor which could not be satisfied. 
David M. Ebel 
33 See 7 MooRE, FmERAL PRAcrICE 1[ 65.09 (2d ed. 1955). 
